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**The Role of the Legislative Body
of the Russian Parliament, the Duma,
in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict:
The Human Rights Violations form the Wars
in Chechnya to the Occupation of Crimea**

Abstract

This chapter explores the link between the erosion of legislative power in Russia and human rights violations perpetrated by the Kremlin in its „near abroad”. It argues that the weakening of the Duma, Russia’s Parliament, since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000, has emboldened executive overreach on human rights issues.

The chapter examines two fundamental case studies: 1) The Chechen Wars and Beyond: This section analyzes how the Duma’s failure to act as a check on the executive during the Second Chechen War (1999-2009) set a precedent for future human rights abuses in the region. 2) The Annexation of Crimea and the Plight of the Crimean Tatars: This section investigates how the 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent persecution of the Crimean Tatars exemplifies Russia’s disregard for international human rights norms and the Duma’s complicity in such violations.

By analyzing these cases, the chapter demonstrates how a weakened legislature has facilitated the Kremlin’s exploitation of „frozen conflicts” in former Soviet territories to undermine human rights and pursue geopolitical agendas. The chapter briefly mentions the concept of „frozen conflicts” and their significance for Russia’s foreign policy. It also highlights the broader implications of Russia’s human rights record for the international order.

Keywords: Human Rights, Russia, Duma, Crimea, Ukraine, Chechnya

Introduction

In the intricate tapestry of human existence, human rights are a vital thread that weaves together personal development, freedom, and the essence of our shared existence. From ancient times to today, pursuing these fundamental rights has shaped societies, sparked revolutions, and transcended borders. The journey toward international recognition of human rights gained momentum after the French and American revolutions. Constitutional guarantees paved the way for a seismic shift – the global acceptance of human rights. At the heart of this transformation lies the United Nations (UN) Convention on Human Rights, a landmark document that resonates across cultures and continents. Under the UN's stewardship, a harmonious chorus of nations has embraced human rights principles. However, this symphony extends beyond the realm of states. Other international actors now wield influence in our interconnected world-marked by globalization and the advent of Industry 4.0. An information-centric, interdependent economic system shapes the landscape, challenging traditional roles and responsibilities.

Increased risk of international conflict and war and nuclear disasters, hunger and drought, widening gaps between rich and underdeveloped countries, the rise of international terrorism and violence, environmental problems and climate change, global pandemics such as AIDS and COVID-19, population growth, racial, ethnic and religious civil conflicts, the rise of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and populist leaders, and the evisceration of the concepts of human rights and the rule of law. The impact of globalization on human rights was best described by the UN Secretary-General at the 55th session of the UN General Assembly in 2000 as follows:

The Internet allows different regions and cultures to communicate very quickly. People can access information virtually, even if they are very far away... This significantly promotes progress in the fields of public health and education. The Internet connects civil society representatives, leading to direct interaction and protection of human rights... The Internet is also used as a tool for human rights violations such as hate speech, racist propaganda, child pornography, religious intolerance, and attitudes toward women. The Internet encourages discrimination and the effective abuse of freedom of expression¹.

The post-Soviet era has witnessed a concerted effort by the Russian Federation to align its legal framework with international human rights standards. Key constitutional amendments were introduced, reflecting a commitment to fundamental

¹ *Globalization and Its Influence on Human Rights Enforcement*, UN General Assembly 55th Session Preliminary Report, Geneva, 31 VIII 2000.

rights. Concurrently, legal codes – from civil to criminal statutes – have been revised to incorporate universally recognized norms. These legal transformations have aimed to bridge the gap between domestic legislation and international obligations. A pivotal milestone emerged with the establishment of the Russian Commissioner for Human Rights – an independent institution that monitors and advocates for individual liberties. This office, unprecedented in Russian history, has served as a sentinel, scrutinizing state actions and safeguarding citizens' rights. Reforms within the Russian judiciary have bolstered the protection of human rights. Emphasis on fair trials, due process, and judicial independence have contributed to a more robust legal environment during the 1990s. However, challenges persist, necessitating ongoing vigilance. Free and fair elections have remained crucial for political pluralism until the Putin era. The electoral process has shaped the democratic fabric, allowing diverse voices to resonate. We explore the delicate balance between electoral integrity and the realization of human rights. Despite progress, socioeconomic disparities persist. Poverty rates surged during the examined period, affecting millions of Russians. The struggle for an adequate standard of living has remained a central concern. Russia has faced challenges in health, education, and life expectancy. Disparities in access to quality healthcare, educational opportunities, and lifespan underscore the need for sustained efforts.

In 2003, the number of people living below the poverty line in Russia was 33 million. According to the 2003 data of the Russian State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat), 20.3 percent of the population, i.e., 29 million people, live below the poverty line. Regarding social, economic, and cultural rights, Russia was behind in many areas, such as health, education, wages, working life, income distribution, and life expectancy, from 1999 to 2004².

According to the 2022 report published annually by Freedom House, in which countries are rated in political rights and civil liberties, the Russian Federation was rated as not free with 19 points out of 100. In the political rights category, where the highest score is 40, the Kremlin administration received only 5 points. In the civil liberties category, where the highest score was 60, Russia scored 14 points³. The democratic transformation and steps to improve human rights in Russia, which started with glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) under Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet Union leader before the Cold War, continued under Boris Yeltsin, the first president of the Russian Federation. Seeking to establish good relations with Western societies, especially the United States and the European Union (EU), the Kremlin administration has strengthened its

² F.M. Rudinsky, *Civil Human Rights in Russia: Modern Problems of Theory and Practice*, New York 2017.

³ *Countries and Territories, Freedom in the World 2022*, Freedom House, 2022, <https://freedom-house.org/countries/freedom-world/scores> (12 XI 2022).

political, economic, and social relations in the context of mutual interest and normative power. Human rights institutions have been established at the federal and local levels in Russia since 1993, following European human rights standards to fulfill the demands of the Russian youth, who embrace Western values, democracy, a free market economy, and liberal freedoms. On 22 XI 1991, the Declaration on Human Rights and Civil Liberties, adopted during the Soviet Union, prepared the legal basis for human rights institutions in Russia. The Russian Ombudsman, the Regional Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman for the Rights of the Child were adopted by amendments to Articles 45 and 103 of the Russian Constitution in 1993. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation was established by the State Duma through an amendment to the Federal Constitution on 25 XII 1996, and officially established on 4 III 1997, with the signature of the President of Russia on 26 II 1997. Annual reports on the human rights situation in Russia prepared by the Commissioner's Office are transmitted for consideration by the State Duma of the Russian Parliament, the Presidium of the Russian Federation, the Investigative Committee, and the General Prosecutor's Office⁴.

Russia's human rights record is abysmal on the most fundamental rights, such as the right to life, freedom of expression and thought, freedom to seek justice, and the right to a fair trial. The prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment has become one of the most fundamental issues of the international community. Social, economic, and cultural rights, such as the right to social security, the right to rest, the right to education, the right to participate in cultural life, the right to health, nutrition, and sustenance, the right to work and the right to form trade unions, are the subject of less scholarly work. Under Putin, Russia has experienced a decline in fundamental rights and a relative improvement in social, economic, and cultural rights. The sanctity of life, a cornerstone of human rights, encountered formidable challenges. Reports from the Commissioner for Human Rights, corroborated by international organizations and scholarly analyses, painted a somber picture. Instances of extrajudicial killings, custodial deaths, and violence against vulnerable populations cast shadows over the Russian landscape. The right to life, enshrined in international conventions, faltered – an indictment against a society grappling with its demons. The quest for an adequate standard of living remained elusive for many Russians – poverty – both acute and entrenched – engulfed millions. Families wrestled with deprivation, their aspirations stifled by economic disparities.

The promise of dignified existence, enshrined in human rights charters, seemed distant as the chasm widened. Access to necessities – housing, health-

⁴ İ. Aras, *Avrupa Birliği-Rusya İlişkilerinde İnsan Hakları*, „Avrasya Etüdleri” 2019, p. 101, <http://www.avrasyaetudleri.com/makaleler/oku/13> (12 XI 2022).

care, and education – remained uneven, perpetuating cycles of vulnerability. Economic and social rights – often overshadowed – stood at the crossroads. Workers, toiling in factories, fields, and offices, bore the brunt of an unequal system. Russia's labor force, paradoxically contributing to the nation's economic prowess, grappled with meager wages – the lowest in Europe. Income inequality gnawed at the fabric of social cohesion. The promise of fair wages, decent working conditions, and social security remained unfulfilled for many. Within this complex tapestry, voices echoed – a collective plea for justice, equity, and human dignity. Civil society, academics, and activists rallied, demanding systemic reforms. The Russian Federation, poised at the intersection of tradition and transformation, faced a defining moment. Would it heed the call to uphold human rights or remain ensnared in its contradictions?

Overview of Human Rights in Russia

With the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act, Soviet policymakers began to draw international attention to the Soviet-era human rights record. During the detente period of the Cold War, it was significant that on 1 VIII 1975, thirty-three European countries, including the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union, signed the Helsinki Final Act. Within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), all signatories of the Final Act agreed to respect fundamental human rights and freedoms and to accept the free movement of people, information, and ideas across national borders. It also paved the way for future peaceful changes, as all countries recognized the inviolability and legitimacy of borders in Europe. Leonid Brezhnev, then Secretary General of the Soviet Union, used the 1975 Final Act to implement the principle of peaceful coexistence.

In the post-Soviet era, Russia's commitment to human rights has been marked by both progress and setbacks. The country's application to join the Council of Europe in the 1990s was initially rejected due to the ongoing First Chechen War. However, Russia's admission to the Council of Europe in 1996 was a significant step forward, requiring the country to respect the rule of law and human rights. Russia's progressive steps on human rights accelerated after the end of the First Chechen War. First, Russia expressed its willingness to become a member of the Council of Europe in the 1990s. The first conditions for membership of the Council of Europe are the rule of law and respect for human rights. The Kremlin's first application was rejected in 1995 because of the first Chechen war. Russia was later admitted as a member of the Council of Europe in February 1996. After becoming a member, Russia's first task was to ask the Duma, the Russian Parliament, to make the necessary legislative changes on the death penalty. Russia was

required to declare a moratorium on the death penalty one year after signing Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights and ratify it within three years. Article 1 of the Sixth Protocol states, „The death penalty is abolished. No one shall be subjected to it or executed⁵”.

Boris Yeltsin, the first President of the Russian Federation, wanted his nation to join the European family. To this end, he was ready to carry out reforms and join the Council of Europe and the European Union (European Community). The most essential condition for joining the European family was abolishing the death penalty. Russian public opinion was against the death penalty and did not support its abolition. Although less popular than Yeltsin at the time, the Russian Duma did not want to abolish the death penalty as the Russian public did. Since 1997, a middle-of-the-road formula has resolved these two views in Russian domestic politics⁶. On 3 VI 1999, Boris Yeltsin commuted the death sentences of 713 prisoners held in a unique camp prison near the city of Vologda to life imprisonment or 25 years in prison. On 28 II 1996, Russia became a member of the Council of Europe. It was the only member of the Council of Europe to have signed, but not ratified by the Russian Parliament, the 6th Additional Protocol to the ECHR abolishing the death penalty. Between January and August 1996, 53 Russian prisoners were executed. After the Russian President signed the moratorium on the death penalty, de facto executions were not carried out on Russian territory⁷.

The most prominent human rights defender after the establishment of the Russian Federation should be Sergey Adamovich Kovalyov. A 39-year-old biologist at Moscow State University during the Soviet Union, Kovalyov resigned from his post in September 1969 and founded the first human rights NGO, the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in March 1990, Kovalyov was appointed to two important posts. He became Russia's first Commissioner for Human Rights and the diplomat representing the Russian Federation to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. He worked on Russia's compliance with global human rights rules and norms and tried to redefine Russia's image in the West on these issues. Kovalyov was critical as the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Duma of the Russian Parliament.

⁵ Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 28 IV 1983, <https://rm.coe.int/168007952b> (12 XI 2022).

⁶ O.B. Semukhina, J.F. Galliher, *Death Penalty Politics and Symbolic Law in Russia*, [in:] *The International Library of Essays on Capital Punishment*, vol. III: *Policy and Governance*, ed. P. Hodgkinson, New York 2013, pp. 191-214.

⁷ *Russia and the Death Penalty*, International Federation for Human Rights, 13 IX 1999, <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/russia/Russia-and-the-Death-Penalty> (12 XI 2022).

Sergey Adamovich Kovalyov, a prominent human rights defender, played a crucial role in promoting human rights in Russia. As the country's first Commissioner for Human Rights and diplomat to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Kovalyov worked tirelessly to promote Russia's compliance with global human rights norms. His efforts to redefine Russia's image in the West on human rights issues were particularly significant⁸.

Given Russia's communist past, constitutional and legal guarantees of human rights are no longer viable in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. In 1991, the Legislative Reform emphasized the establishment of a solid and independent judiciary in Russia to protect human rights. Article 46 of the 1993 Constitution provides for legal guarantees for everyone in the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens. Russia's accession to the Council of Europe paved the way for achieving advanced, comprehensive, consistent human rights standards. Russia's ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights has provided an umbrella of protection for Russian citizens with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as a sanction mechanism. By signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Additional Protocols, Russia also accepted the jurisdiction of the UN Human Rights Committee. Having signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Russia is also a party to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

In 2000, Russia signed the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court (ICC) founding document, which opened for signature in 1998. In the 2010s, following Russia's military intervention first in Syria and then the invasion of Crimea, the ICC defined the illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea as „a military crisis between Russia and Ukraine” and „a violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity”, Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to withdraw Russia from the ICC. This decision was also influenced by Great Britain's application to the ICC to initiate an investigation into the Russian military airstrikes in Syria on the grounds of war crimes. In 2000, the Kremlin authorities accepted ICC jurisdiction but withdrew their signature 14 years later. It should be underlined that although Russia signed the Rome Statute, it was not ratified by the Russian Parliament for 14 years. In February 2022, the ICC, which started its active work with the entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 VI 2002, initiated an ICC investigation upon the application of Ukraine for the violation of the law of war after the Russian-Ukrainian War in February 2022, especially after the apparent violation of the „prohibition of the use of force”, one of the most important rules of international law, especially after the sharing of video and photographic records

⁸ E. Gilligan, *Defending Human Rights in Russia: Sergei Kovalyov, Dissident and Human Rights Commissioner, 1969-2003*, New York 2004.

of mass killings, torture and rape of Ukrainian civilians by Russian soldiers in the heart of Europe on 1 IV 2022, twenty years after the establishment of the ICC. Although Ukraine is a signatory to the Rome Statute, following its provision on acceptance of ICC jurisdiction by notification, Ukraine notified the ICC on 9 XI 2014, following the Russian occupation of Crimea, that Kyiv would become a party to the Rome Statute and accepted jurisdiction over four crimes under international criminal law falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC committed by Russians in Crimea, a Ukrainian territory, between 21 XI 2013 and 22 II 2014. On 4 II 2015, the second notification was extended to cover crimes committed and future crimes committed on Ukrainian territory after 20 II 2014, without specifying an end date⁹. In conclusion, while progress and setbacks have marked Russia's human rights record, its commitment to human rights has been a significant aspect of its development. The abolition of the death penalty, strengthening human rights protections, and promoting human rights defenders like Sergey Adamovich Kovalyov have all contributed to a more rights-respecting environment in Russia.

The Russian Parliament Duma and Human Rights: A Critical Analysis

The Russian Parliament reached its current structure in three stages. The first phase started with the new legislative structure of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, which was established in 1989 under Gorbachev and continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991. This short period was crucial in building the legislative infrastructure of the newly independent Russia. Different committees were set up to formulate policy, a division of labor was established, deputies became experts in the legislative field, speeches from the rostrum were allowed in the legislative process, and deputies went to their constituencies. They met with voters, the bicameral Parliament was made to work following different political interests, and most importantly, intra-party factionalism began. The USSR People's Congress and Supreme Soviet convened in May 1989 and was dissolved in September 1991 following the coup attempt in August 1991. The second stage was the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), which continued to function as the Parliament of the newly independent Russia between 1990 and 1993. A presidential decree issued by Yeltsin also dissolved this Parliament. The final stage was the post-election formation of the new Russian

⁹ Y. Acer, *Ukrayna Savaşı ve Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi'ndeki Süreç*, „Kriter” 2022, vol. 6, no. 67, <https://kriterdergi.com/dosya-ukrayna-krizi/ukrayna-savasi-ve-uluslararasi-ceza-mahkemesindeki-surec> (18 XII 2022).

Federal Assembly in December 1993 and its first meeting in January 1994. After the Duma elections were held in December 1995, the new Duma was inaugurated for the first time in January 1996¹⁰. The Russian Federal Assembly consists of two chambers. The upper house, the Federation Council, has 176 seats and consists of two senators from each of the 83 federal administrative units (21 republics, nine states (Kray), 46 regions (Oblast), two federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and five autonomous regions), appointed for four-year terms. The lower house of the Russian Parliament, the State Duma, has had 450 seats since 2007 and is constituted by direct popular election of candidates from parties passing the 7% electoral threshold for a four-year term.

When the Russian State Duma adopted the European Convention on Human Rights in May 1998, it marked a significant milestone for human rights in Russia. The Kremlin's acceptance of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), one of the essential organs of the Council of Europe, which was established in Western Europe in 1949 during the Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers, was one of the significant historical developments. In addition to the ability of Council of Europe member states to complain to the ECHR against Russia for human rights violations, the acceptance of the right of individual application by Russian citizens can be characterized as a revolutionary development in the post-Soviet Russian legal system. Despite Russia's admission as a member of the Council of Europe in 1996, leaders in Strasbourg and Moscow were aware that much work was needed to transform Russia into a human rights-friendly country.

According to the Russian Constitution and international human rights conventions signed by Russia, the Russian authorities must respect and comply with the right to life, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and demonstration, the right not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment, the right not to be discriminated against, etc. Analyzing Russian domestic political developments, especially over the last decade, it would be fanciful to expect the Russian Parliament to be a champion of human rights. However, at this point, it would be appropriate to point out the human rights issues that urgently need legislative solutions for the 450 members of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation directly elected by the people¹¹.

The Russian Constitution of 1993 was one of the essential steps in the protection of human rights. Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Russian Constitution states that „the rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens are recognized and

¹⁰ T.F. Remington, *The Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime, 1989-1999*, New Haven 2001.

¹¹ *Ten Urgent Human Rights Tasks for the New Duma*, Amnesty International, IX 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/RUSSIA-TEN-URGENT-HUMAN-RIGHTS-TASKS-FOR-THE-NEW-DUMA.pdf> (18 XII 2022).

guaranteed by the Russian Federation following the generally recognized norms and principles of international law⁷. The second part of the Constitution lists the human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights based on international human rights standards in different articles. Article 15, paragraph 4 of the 1993 Constitution states that generally recognized international principles and norms and international treaties are part of the legal system of the Russian Federation and that international treaties take precedence over domestic law. In this context, human rights are guaranteed under both the Constitution and international human rights law. Article 2 of the Constitution states that „individuals and their rights and freedoms are of the highest value, and the state must recognize, respect, and protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens”¹². However, these radical steps Russia took in the field of human rights law led to a regression in human rights with subsequent amendments to the Constitution and laws. The Russian Constitution no longer enshrines the supremacy of international human rights principles and norms in the Russian legislative system.

Human Rights Violations in Chechnya: A Multidimensional Analysis

The Chechnya conflict, spanning the tumultuous years from 1990 to 2005, remains a haunting chapter in the annals of human rights violations and war crimes. As the Russian Federation grappled with political upheavals and global shifts, the plight of civilians – caught in the crossfire – became a stark testament to the fragility of human dignity. This section dissects the multifaceted dimensions of this conflict, examining legal frameworks, political dynamics, and international ramifications. In addition to human rights violations in Chechnya under both the Russian Constitution and international humanitarian law, human rights defenders claim that the Russian Federation, as a signatory to the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998, has committed crimes under international criminal law, particularly war crimes. Human rights violations in Chechnya between 1990 and 2005 fall under the categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity, which fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although Russian soldiers and civilians have also been subjected to human rights violations by Chechen militants, it would be wrong to compare the genocidal practices of the Russian state against Chechen civilians based on racial discrimination. The human rights and war crimes issues in Chechnya can be analyzed from three perspectives. First, human

¹² P.B. Maggs, O. Schwartz, W. Burnam, *Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation*, New York 2015, p. 323.

rights violations by Russian and Chechen militants can be identified, explained, and presented to the world community. Second, the impact of political developments in Russia on massacres and genocide-like practices in Chechnya can be analyzed. Thirdly, the Chechnya conflict, which was included in the scope of Global Terrorism, especially as a result of the 11 IX attacks in 2001, can be analyzed in the international dimension and within the framework of international systemic developments. Approximately 65-70 thousand people have died in the Chechnya conflict since 1994¹³. The Russian state authorities' explanation for the civilian victims in Chechnya is that they are an unintended consequence of the government's military necessity in the context of international terrorism. This explanation must have been accepted by both Russian and international public opinion, especially after the 11 IX attacks, when human rights violations against Chechen civilians remained only in the pages of reports, except for a few international non-governmental organizations and human rights defenders. Hedley Bull's concept of International Society, that is, the international order in which states cooperate in order to maintain common institutions by accepting specific rules for their behavior based on shared values and common interests, requires an answer to the question of whether what happened in Chechnya is genocide, ethnic cleansing or racism. The Russian government aims to exterminate the entire Chechen population by destroying the Chechen political and intellectual elite and creating an atmosphere of fear, preventing the separatists from being supported financially and psychologically. In order to control Chechens through fear and military tactics, the Russian government has resorted to extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, rape, torture, looting, arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and practices that violate human dignity. According to a 2005 report, during the six-year Chechen conflict, there have been between 3,000 and 5,000 unsolved murders and abductions by the Russian federal army and pro-Russian Chechen forces¹⁴. After being called Chechen fighters in 1994, Chechens have been dehumanized since 1999, especially by using the concept of the international war on terrorism and racist, bigoted terms such as blacks (cherry), bandits (bandit), terrorists (terrorists), cockroaches (tarakany) and bed-bugs (slope)¹⁵.

After the Second Chechen War began, the main view in different parts of the world about human rights violations in Chechnya was that it was one of the most significant human rights disasters in post-Cold War Europe. Human rights

¹³ E. Gilligan, *Terror In Chechnya: Russia and The Tragedy of Civilians In War*, Princeton 2010, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Worse Than a War: „Disappearance” in Chechnya – A Crime Against Humanity*, „A Human Right Watch Briefing Paper”, III 2005, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/chechnya0305/chechnya0305.pdf> (30 XII 2022).

¹⁵ E. Gilligan, *Terror In Chechnya...*, p. 6.

violations began with the civil war that started in the years after 1991, when Chechen leader Dudayev, who was previously a commander in the Soviet Air Force, was at the head of the rebel armed forces in Chechnya during the Yeltsin period. In December 1994, after Yeltsin, whom Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev convinced that a single airborne regiment would capture Grozny within two hours, sent 40 thousand poorly trained Russian military units to Chechnya, the war entered the escalation phase. The Russian army suffered heavy losses in Grozny during World War II. It bombarded civilians with the most significant heavy weapon and artillery fire seen after World War II. A Russian soldier who had just returned from Chechnya told Los Angeles Times reporter Maura Reynolds:

I killed a lot. I wouldn't touch women or children as long as they didn't fire at me. But I would kill all the men I met during mopping-up operations. I didn't feel sorry for them one bit. They deserved it. I wouldn't even listen to the pleas or see the tears of their women when they asked me to spare their men. I simply took them aside and killed them¹⁶.

The Russians were detaining mass Chechen men and sending them to „filtering camps” run by the FSB (former KGB). Torture and extermination were common in these camps. When Chechen rebel forces recaptured Grozny in 1996, the United Nations stated that it was „the most destroyed city in the world”¹⁷.

World War II was restarted by Putin in 1999. The human rights violations of the Russian Federation in the Chechen War continued as in the previous conflict. It was stated that war crimes were committed by non-governmental organizations during this period, including the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets, all Chechen men being seen as rebels and being taken to filtering camps, as well as the sexual assault and rape of Chechen women¹⁸. In 2001, the Conscience Committee of the United States Holocaust Museum included Chechnya on the Genocide List¹⁹.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, to which the Russian Parliament Duma sent members, condemned human rights violations in Chechnya in January 2000:

¹⁶ M. Reynolds, *War Has No Rules for Russian Forces Battling Chechen Rebels*, „The Los Angeles Times”, 17 IX 2000, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-sep-17-mn-22524-story.html> (30 XII 2022).

¹⁷ S. Shuster, *Putin's Secret Agents*, „Time” 2022, <https://time.com/putin-secret-agents/> (30 XII 2022).

¹⁸ *War Crimes In Chechnya and the Response of the West*, Human Rights Watch, 29 X 2000, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west> (30 XII 2022).

¹⁹ A. Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*, New York 2006, p. 382.

Mass violence against civilians is completely unacceptable. Military operations carried out by Russia in Chechnya have tragic consequences on the sizeable civilian population within the Autonomous Republic. As a result of the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by Russian forces, innocent non-combatant civilians in Chechnya are harmed by severe violations of the most basic human rights, such as the right to security, the right to freedom, and the right to life²⁰.

It is generally accepted that the policies implemented by Putin during the Chechen War played an essential role in his coming to power. In an interview before the elections in 2000, Putin stated that after being appointed Prime Minister by Yeltsin, he had three to four months to inflict hell on the bandits in Chechnya. Between August 2002 and August 2003, the hottest period of the Chechen War in military terms, dozens of Russian soldiers died every day, according to official figures, 4,749. There were at least ten times as many deaths from Chechen rebels and civilians. As a result of heavy bombardments in Chechen lands, the economic situation worsened during this period, and a new Chechen generation was formed, growing up under violence and anger. Human rights violations, especially torture and disappearance of people, were committed by the Russian army, which is, in a sense, legally untouchable. International non-governmental organizations such as the UN Human Rights Commission, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the Moscow Helsinki Group, Human Rights Watch, and Doctors Without Borders have actively worked against these human rights violations. The Danish Refugee Council and Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen are actively focused on human rights issues in the North Caucasus. However, since these institutions had to work with the Russians in the field of Chechnya, it was tough to document human rights violations or for Chechens to come and complain with a petition. The Council of Europe has shown that it has influence in Moscow as the only crucial international organization due to its presence as the only observer on the field and the failure of the European Court of Human Rights to adequately prosecute human rights violations in Chechnya in Russian domestic legal remedies²¹.

²⁰ Recommendation 1444 (2000): The Conflict in Chechnya, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 27 I 2000, <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=16772&lang=en> (30 XII 2022).

²¹ A. Jack, *Inside Putin's Russia*, Oxford 2006, p. 128, 276.

Human Rights Violations in Crimea

Although human rights violations in the Crimean peninsula were recorded as the geography where human rights violations occurred the most on the European continent, following the occupation of Crimea by Russia immediately after the closing of the 22nd Winter Olympics held in Sochi, Russia, in February 2014, their homeland is Crimea. Crimean Tatars who returned to Turkey have faced human rights violations since 1991. In 1783, Russian Empress II. Crimean Tatars, who lost their state in Crimea, which Russia annexed during the reign of Catherine I, have struggled since then to ensure that their human rights are respected as the indigenous people of Crimea. After the elections held in December 1917, the Crimean Tatar Congress convened for the first time on 9 XII 1917. The Crimean People's Republic was established, and its Constitution and state symbols were adopted. The congress was declared the first Parliament of the People's Republic of Crimea, and among the 76 deputies, five female deputies of Turkish origin were elected. As one of these female MPs, Şefika Gaspıralı, the daughter of İsmail Bey Gaspıralı, witnessed the Bolsheviks entering Akmescit and the occupation of the Congress assembly by Bolshevik soldiers on 27 I 2018²².

The 2014 occupation of Crimea can be defined, first of all, as an unlawful action that is contrary to the prohibition of a state from occupying another state's territory by force, according to many international law documents such as the United Nations Convention, the Treaty on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Helsinki Final Act. The Moscow administration has openly violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine as a signatory and guarantor state of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. In addition to this unlawful use of force and occupation, it violated the human rights of all people living in Crimea, including the Russians, especially the Crimean Tatars, who are the indigenous people of the Crimean Peninsula²³.

One of the significant developments is that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decided to examine the application made by Ukraine regarding human rights violations between 27 II 2014, and 26 VIII 2015, after the 2014 invasion of Crimea. The list of human rights violations subject to the application

²² U. Akyol, *Kırım Ahali Cumhuriyeti ve Kırım'da İlk Bolşevik İşgali (1917-1918)*, „Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih” 2018, no. 19, pp. 87-88, <https://dergipark.org.tr/pub/ustich/issue/44797/557241> (7 XII 2022).

²³ B. Çalışkan, *Kırım Raporu: Jeopolitik Rekabette Düşüm Noktası*, Araştırma 109, Insamer, I 2020, p. 16-18, http://www.kirimderneği.org.tr/Dosyalar/Raporlar/insamer_dosya_2586.pdf (7 XII 2022); *İşgal Altındaki Kırım'da İnsan Hakları İhlalleri ve Rusya Federasyonu'ndaki Genel İnsan Hakları İhlalleri Hakkında. Rapor*, Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi, Ankara, 10 XII 2019, Ankara, <http://www.kirimderneği.org.tr/Dosyalar/Raporlar/InsanHaklari2020.pdf> (7 XII 2020).

in Crimea is very long. It includes the right to life, freedom and security, a fair trial, the prohibition of torture, respect for private and family life, freedom of movement, and discrimination, as stated in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The application regarding the violation of the right to education and the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, expression, assembly, and association by Russia was accepted due to the consistency of the information provided by the Ukrainian government. Complaints about Russia's short-term detention of foreign journalists in Crimea and Russia's murder in Crimea were rejected by the ECHR because sufficient evidence was not provided²⁴.

Those most affected by the human rights violations that started with the occupation of Crimea in 2014 were Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians living in Crimea. These violations against the Crimean Tatars have been reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the High Commissioner for National Minorities, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe affiliated with the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights, the United States Department of State and the Senate. It has been presented to the knowledge and sensitivity of the international public through reports prepared by closely monitoring international organizations and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Crimean Turks Culture and Solidarity Association²⁵.

In Crimea, many human rights specified in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, which are the fundamental documents of international humanitarian law, have been violated, especially against the Crimean Tatars, who have the status of the indigenous people of Crimea. The human rights violated can be listed as follows:

- 1) Political Rights and Rights to Political Representation.
- 2) Freedoms of Thought, Expression and Press.
- 3) Freedom of Religion and Conscience.
- 4) Right to Life: Kidnapping, disappearance, unsolved murders.
- 5) Personal Safety and Physical Integrity.
- 6) Freedom of Travel.
- 7) Right to Education.
- 8) Socioeconomic Rights.
- 9) Right to Fair Trial.

²⁴ AİHM, *Rusya'nın Kırım'daki insan hakları ihlallerine ilişkin başvuruların büyük bölümünü inceleyecek*, 14 I 2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/aihm-rusyanin-kirimdaki-insan-haklari-ihlallerine-iliskin-basvurularin-buyuk-bolumunu-inceleyecek/2109990> (7 XII 2022).

²⁵ V. Morkva, *Rusya'nın 2014 İlhakı Sonrası Kırım'da Kırım Tatar Halkının Durumu*, „Türk Dün-yası İncelemeler Dergisi” 2021, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 375-397.

- 10) Systematic Intimidation, detentions, arrests and convictions.
- 11) Illegal house and mosque searches.
- 12) Citizenship rights: Accepting Russian citizenship and passport and forcing compulsory military service in the Russian army.
- 13) Violations of Cultural Rights and Cultural Heritage.
- 14) Right to Meeting and Organizing.
- 15) Right to Health and Effects of COVID-19 Pandemic²⁶.

Following the occupation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, systematic human rights violations against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian citizens living in Crimea began to be seen, and even, according to some international law commentators, evidence that Russia had committed crimes against humanity began to be seen. First, Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), which replaced the KGB, prevented access to accurate information in Crimea, and a Russian propaganda campaign was launched. In the first hours of the occupation, Crimean Tatars who demonstrated peacefully against the Russian occupation were detained, and later kidnappings, physical violence, and unlawful detentions were applied to the Crimean Tatars. The de facto Russian administration in Crimea has started its attacks on the political rights of Crimean Tatars²⁷. First, KTMM, the representative body of the Crimean Tatars, was raided on 17 IX 2014, by members of the Russian FSB, police, and armed civilian militias, with an illegal search warrant, because it was an „extremist organization”. Then, the prosecutor appointed by Putin, Nataliya Poklonskaya, declared KTMM to Russia. The closure case was opened on 5 II 2016, on charges of acting against the territorial integrity of the Republic of Turkey and being an extremist organization. The Russian Supreme Court in Crimea, which made this unlawful decision, sentenced KTMM President Rifat Chubarov to 6 years in prison and a fine of 200 thousand rubles (23,278 liras) in June 2021 for allegedly organizing the 2014 mass riots²⁸.

The non-governmental organization called Crimean Solidarity (Krymskaia Solidarnost), which works specifically for Crimea and Crimean Tatars on human rights, was established in 2016 by the gathering of Crimean Tatar human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and sympathizers of the organization who were arrested after the establishment of Hizb ut-Tahrir (Islamic Freedom Party). With

²⁶ N.K. Bayar, *İşgal Sonrası Kırım'da İnsan Hakları Suçları ve Uluslararası Hukukta Durum*, [in:] *Geçmişten Geleceğe Kırım: Sorunlar ve Çözüm Yolları*, ed. F.T. Aydın Bezikoğlu, İstanbul 2022, pp. 147-162.

²⁷ K. Dee, *Repeating History: Russia Inflicting Crimea Against Humanity Upon The Crimean Tatars*, „American University International Law Review” 2021, vol. 36, issue 2, pp. 287-336.

²⁸ T. Yavuz, *Rus mahkemesi Kırım Tatar Milli Meclisi Başkanı Çubarov'a 6 yıl hapis cezası verdi*, 1 VI 2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/rus-mahkemesi-kirim-tatar-milli-meclisi-bas-kani-cubarova-6-yil-hapis-cezasi-verdi/2260409> (7 XII 2022).

Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014, Hizb ut-Tahrir, like the Crimean Tatar National Assembly (KTMM), was described as a terrorist organization. According to the Crimean Human Rights Group report in 2020, the number of people arrested in Crimea was 69 and they were sentenced to 12-19 years in high security prisons. Crimean Solidarity, mainly consisting of relatives of Hizb ut-Tahrir members, has been the most active post-occupation non-governmental organization in Crimea regarding human rights violations in the post-2016 period. One reason for this is that KTMM members experienced World War II through forced migration out of Crimea after the Russian occupation. As a result of the Exile Incident and the banning of prominent figures such as Crimean Tatars leader Mustafa Abdülcemil Kırımoğlu and KTMM President Rifat Çubarov from entering Crimea, the political balance was re-established among the Crimean Tatars and the gap was somehow filled²⁹.

The detention and arrest of KTMM Deputy Chairman Ahtem Çiygöz by the Russian authorities, who have de facto control in Crimea, within the scope of intimidation and oppression of the Crimean Tatars on 29 I 2015, was condemned by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkey called for respect for the democratic and human rights of the Crimean Tatars³⁰. The so-called court and judges of Russia, which occupied Crimea, arrested the leader of the Crimean Tatars, Aktem Çingöz, and sentenced him to 8 years in prison on charges of mass uprising in their trial on 11 IX 2017. Holding the court's decision hearing on September 11 is an attempt to create the perception in the Russian and Western public opinion that the Crimean Tatars are part of Islamic global terrorism. As a result of this trial, Tanya Cooper from the Human Rights Observatory stated that „an unlawful trial cannot be accepted and Çiygöz should be freed as soon as possible”. The statement continues: „Çingöz's trial and sentencing to prison is the price of peaceful actions against the Russian occupation in Crimea and was done to intimidate³¹”. Later, with the initiatives of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ahtem Çiygöz and İlmi Umerov, who was sentenced to two years in prison, were released and sent to Turkey. Similarly, on 21 IX 2022, Turkey reported that it found

²⁹ E. Muratova, *The Transformation of the Crimean Tatars' Institutions and Discourses After 2014*, „Journal of Nationalism, Memory and Language Politics” 2019, vol. 13, issue 1, pp. 44-66; idem, *Gender roles and Muslim women's activism in post-2014 Crimea*, „Religion, State and Society” 2022, vol. 5, issue 1, pp. 60-75.

³⁰ Güncel Açıklamalar No: 41, 30 I 2015, Kırım Tatar Milli Meclisi Başkan Yardımcısı Çiygöz'ün Tutuklanması Hk., Dışişleri Bakanlığı, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-41_-30-ocak-2015_-kirim-tatar-milli-meclisi-baskan-yardimcisi-ciygoz_un-tutuklanmasi-hk_.tr.mfa (7 XII 2022).

³¹ *Crimea: Baseless Conviction of Crimean Tatar Leader*, Human Rights Watch, 12 IX 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/12/crimea-baseless-conviction-crimean-tatar-leader> (31 XII 2022).

the politically motivated conviction of KTMM Deputy Chairman Nerimal Celal and Crimean Tatar rights defenders Asan and Aziz Ahmetov brothers alarming³².

Conclusion

One of the worst examples in the human rights record of the Russian Parliament is the adoption of two bills in its session on 7 VI 2022, during the Russia-Ukraine 2014-2022 War. The Kremlin administration, which was accepted as a member of the Council of Europe in 1996 during the reign of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, decided to expel it from this organization on 15 III 2022. Russia, whose membership in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had already been suspended and boycotted after the occupation of Crimea in 2014, announced that Russia had withdrawn from its membership in the Council with its own decision to reintroduce the death penalty. Following these decisions, it was not surprising that the Duma accepted the bill abolishing the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, including Russia's right to the individual application, with only a single member from the Communist Party voting no and all Duma members voting in the affirmative³³. The ECHR and ECHR no longer protect the human rights of millions of Russians.

Before the 2014-2022 Russia-Ukraine War, Russia's human rights record was in poor shape. With the occupation of Crimea in 2014, human rights violations and the destruction of political freedoms, which were implemented as state policy during the former Soviet period, began again. In the name of the security policy of the Russian state, the security institutions of the Russian state have committed actions defined as human rights violations. The most fundamental rights of Russian citizens, namely the right to life and personal security, have been violated very frequently by the Russian state. Although human rights violations until 2014 were relatively due to the ineffectiveness of state institutions to a certain extent, after this date, security and military units, especially the FSB, which are the providers of law and order in Russia, have played a significant role in ignoring human rights. It is not a coincidence that Dmitry Muratov, a Russian journalist and editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta published in Russia, who received the Nobel

³² Güncel Açıklamalar No: 291, 21 IX 2022, Kırım Tatar Milli Meclisi Başkan Yardımcısı Neriman Celal ve Diğer Kırım Tatar Soydaşlarımız Hakkında Mahkumiyet Kararı Verilmesi Hk., Dışişleri Bakanlığı, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-291_-kirim-tatar-milli-meclisi-baskan-yrd-neriman-celal-ve-diger-kirim-tatar-soydaslarimiz-hk-mahkumiyet-karari-verilmesi-hk.tr.mfa (31 XII 2022).

³³ *Russian parliament votes to break with European Court of Human Rights*, 7 VI 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-parliament-votes-exit-european-court-human-rights-2022-06-07/> (31 XII 2022).

Peace Prize in 2021 for defending the freedom of expression, received this award. It should be underlined that Muratov auctioned off his Nobel Peace Prize medal for 103.5 million USD on World Refugee Day and gave the money earned to more than 6 million Ukrainian refugees, primarily women, children, and the elderly³⁴.

According to the UN Human Rights Council's human rights report on the Ukraine-Russia War, published in December 2022, it was revealed that Russian military forces committed actions that would be considered war crimes in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy regions. As a result of interviews with 150 victims and victims in 27 settlements, it was stated in the report that community executions were carried out against civilians and that the victim's hands were tied behind their backs. They had bullet wounds in their heads, and their throats were cut. It has been determined that victims were tortured and mistreated before mass executions³⁵.

The Duma is responsible for passing laws and regulations that impact all regions of Russia, including Chechnya. It can create legal frameworks that protect or undermine human rights. Unfortunately, the Duma has often failed to address the specific human rights concerns in Chechnya adequately. Its legislative efforts have yet to prioritize consistently protecting civilians' rights in the region. The Duma's composition reflects the broader political landscape in Russia. The ruling party, United Russia, dominates it, which maintains close ties with the Kremlin. Chechnya's leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, wields significant influence over the Duma. Putin also aligned with the party, United Russia, which holds a strong presence in the chamber.

Consequently, Kadyrov's interests often align with those of the federal government. This alignment has led to a reluctance within the Duma to challenge Kadyrov's policies, even when they violate human rights. The fear of political repercussions and the desire to maintain stability in the North Caucasus region have hindered meaningful legislative action. The Duma's silence regarding human rights abuses in Chechnya has been deafening. It has rarely taken a strong stance against the Chechen government's actions. When allegations of extrajudicial killings, torture, and disappearances surfaced, the Duma did not initiate comprehensive investigations or hold Chechen officials accountable. Instead, it often echoed the official narrative, dismissing claims as unfounded or exaggerated. By failing to condemn these violations, the Duma indirectly condoned them, perpetuating a culture of impunity. International organizations and foreign governments have raised concerns about Chechnya's human rights record.

³⁴ *Rus gazeteci Nobel Barış Ödülü'nü 103.5 milyon dolara sattı*, 21 VI 2022, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/galeri/dunya/rus-gazeteci-nobel-baris-odulunu-103-5-milyon-dolara-satti,EvECtyfoHkaz-4pyyE1G5A> (31 XII 2022).

³⁵ *War crimes have been committed in Ukraine conflict, top UN human rights inquiry reveals*, 23 IX 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1127691> (31 XII 2022).

Reports from the European Parliament, the U.S. State Department, and human rights groups have highlighted ongoing violations. The Duma's response to international pressure needs to be more consistent. While it occasionally acknowledges the need for improvement, concrete actions still need to be discovered. In conclusion, the Russian State Duma's role in Chechnya's human rights violations is multifaceted. While it has the power to enact meaningful change, its actions still need to catch up.

The Russian State Duma, as the legislative body of Russia, plays a crucial role in shaping policies and laws within the country. However, when it comes to human rights violations in Crimea, its actions have been both significant and controversial. In this essay, we will explore the Duma's involvement in perpetuating or addressing these violations. The Duma is responsible for passing laws that impact all regions of Russia, including Crimea. Its decisions directly affect the rights and freedoms of Crimean residents. Unfortunately, the Duma has often failed to adequately address Crimea's specific human rights concerns. Its legislative efforts have not consistently prioritized the protection of civilians' rights in the invaded region. In 2014, Russia invaded Crimea following a controversial referendum. The Duma played a pivotal role in legitimizing this invasion by swiftly passing legislation to incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation. The international community widely criticized this move, as it violated Ukraine's territorial integrity and led to a host of human rights challenges in Crimea. The Duma has been complicit in suppressing dissent within Crimea. It has passed laws restricting freedom of expression, assembly, and association, especially the Crimean Tatars. Independent media outlets critical of the annexation have been shut down, and journalists face intimidation and harassment. The Duma's silence on these issues perpetuates a climate of fear. The Duma's legislative actions have legitimized repressive measures in Crimea. Laws criminalizing „extremism” and „separatism” have been used to target activists, journalists, and political opponents. These laws allow authorities to detain individuals without due process, leading to arbitrary arrests and detentions. The Duma's failure to address these abuses undermines the rule of law. The Duma's decisions impact education in Crimea. While Russian-language education has expanded, Ukrainian-language and Crimean-Tatar language instruction has been marginalized. The right to education in one's native language is essential, yet the Duma's policies have eroded this right for Crimean Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars. International bodies, including the United Nations and the European Court of Human Rights, have raised concerns about human rights abuses in Crimea. The Duma's response has been dismissive, often denying or downplaying allegations. In conclusion, the Russian State Duma's role in Crimea's human rights violations is significant. Its legislative decisions perpetuate repression and do not contribute to justice and accountability.

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Abstrakt

Sezai Özçelik

Rola organu ustawodawczego rosyjskiego parlamentu – Dumy, w konflikcie rosyjsko-ukraińskim: łamanie praw człowieka od wojny w Czeczenii do okupacji Krymu

W niniejszym artykule zbadano związek między erozją władzy ustawodawczej w Rosji a naruszeniami praw człowieka popełnianymi przez Kreml w jego „blińskiej zagranicy”. W artykule stwierdza się, że osłabienie Dumy – rosyjskiego parlamentu, od czasu dojścia do władzy Władimira Putina w 2000 r., ośmieliło władzę wykonawczą do nadmiernych działań w zakresie praw człowieka. W artykule została zaprezentowana analiza dwóch podstawowych studiów przypadków: 1) wojny czeczeńskie i inne: w tej części przeanalizowano w jaki sposób niepowodzenie Dumy w działaniach kontrolnych władzy wykonawczej podczas drugiej wojny czeczeńskiej (1999-2009) ustanowiło precedens dla przyszłych naruszeń praw człowieka w regionie; 2) aneksja Krymu i trudna sytuacja Tatarów Krymskich: zbadano, w jaki sposób aneksja Krymu w 2014 r. i późniejsze prześlado-

wania Tatarów Krymskich stanowią przykład lekceważenia przez Rosję międzynarodowych norm praw człowieka i współudziału Dumy w takich naruszeniach.

Analizując wskazane przypadki, w artykule pokazano, w jaki sposób osłabiona władza ustawodawcza ułatwiła Kremlowi wykorzystywanie „zamrożonych konfliktów” na terytoriach byłego Związku Radzieckiego do podważania praw człowieka i realizacji programów geopolitycznych. W artykule krótko wspomniano o koncepcji „zamrożonych konfliktów” i ich znaczeniu dla polityki zagranicznej Rosji. Podkreślono również szersze implikacje rosyjskiego przestrzegania praw człowieka dla porządku międzynarodowego.

Słowa kluczowe: prawa człowieka, Rosja, Duma, Krym, Ukraina, Czeczenia

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