By Zarema Mustafaieva
Geopolitical expansion aimed at utilizing inter-ethnic diversity as a tool for destabilization should be examined within the framework of modern hybrid warfare (Catney et al., 2020). In this paradigm, information technologies and manipulations play no less significant role than traditional military actions, substantially broadening our understanding of contemporary conflict. The exploitation of cultural, ethnic, and social contradictions within target states (Kuldas et al., 2021) has become a key element of modern hybrid warfare. This phenomenon gains particular significance in the context of strategies aimed at weakening state sovereignty through the manipulation of ethnic factors (Catney et al., 2020).
Existing research demonstrates the dualistic nature of ethnic diversity in modern societies. On one hand, it can promote intercultural understanding and social cohesion (Umeh et al., 2023 ; Smith et al., 2011). On the other hand, under certain conditions, it can become a source of social tension and inter-ethnic conflicts (Ojo, 2015; Cayón & Chacon, 2022). In the context of hybrid warfare, ethnic diversity is deliberately transformed into an instrument of destabilization (Alan et al., 2023). Adversaries seek to exploit potential inter-ethnic contradictions to undermine state stability and create obstacles for the international integration of the target state (Catney et al., 2020; Kuldas et al., 2021).
Example with Global Events
In Ukraine’s information space, there is an intensification of manipulative practices using the inter-ethnic factor. To define this intensification, we will examine two cases, using a comparative approach in the broader geopolitical context of what is happening in the World. Comparing local incidents in Ukraine with global events is an important method of analysis within the geopolitical approach. This explains Russia’s desire to use “hot spots” in Ukraine’s information space to increase foreign policy pressure.
Reflexive Control Operations: Analysis of Anna Muzychuk’s Case
In Ukraine’s information space, there is an increasing application of reflexive control operations that go beyond traditional understanding of disinformation. One recent example was the story of Ukrainian chess player Anna Muzychuk, used in a media campaign to create a “values divide” between Ukraine and the Muslim world. This case raises important research questions: why was the story revived at this particular moment, and who was behind its dissemination?
In 2017, Anna Muzychuk (Boren, 2017) , a two-time world chess champion, refused to participate in a tournament held in Saudi Arabia. Her decision was based on discriminatory rules requiring women to wear abayas and be accompanied by men. This act became a symbol of the fight for human rights and equality, drawing admiration both in Ukraine and abroad. However, it’s important to note that since then, Saudi Arabia has implemented several reforms, including allowing women to appear in public without male accompaniment.
In December 2023, this story unexpectedly “revived” on social media through a large-scale campaign that reached millions of users in various languages: English, French, Ukrainian, Russian, Arabic, Italian, and Greek. Monitoring systems recorded 843 original publications on Facebook and Twitter, including posts that gathered over 17 thousand reposts and 5.3 million views for a single tweet. This activity drew attention from both anti-Muslim and pro-Muslim groups, triggering a new wave of emotional engagement and discussions. (UA Osint,2023)
It’s particularly noteworthy that the information campaign coincided with important diplomatic successes for Ukraine. In his address, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced cooperation with the Qatar government (24 tv ua, 2023), which enabled the return of one of the deported children from Russia to Ukraine. Countries of the “Global South,” many of which are Muslim, are becoming important partners for Ukraine in overcoming the consequences of war. Such information attacks are aimed at undermining these relationships. Anna Muzychuk’s story (Boren, 2017), which defended human rights in the context of Muslim traditions, was used as a tool to emphasize the conflict of values and break potential ties between Ukraine and the Muslim world. This case is a classic example of how reflexive control operations manipulate positive value stories, turning them into tools for achieving geopolitical goals.
Destabilization Model: System Analysis
The Crimea Platform (Kaledin, 2024; Sedliar, 2023), is the only international format where Crimean Tatars and their rights in their native land become a central topic for discussion among world leaders and political actors. Paradoxically, 2024 became a period of dismissals of Crimean Tatar representatives. On December 4, 2024, the Deputy President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Tamila Tasheva, was dismissed (Decree of the President of Ukraine №800/2024, 2024). Recall that Emine Dzheparova, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, who was at the origins of establishing the Crimean Platform (UA Analytica, 2021, MFA GovUa, 2020), was also dismissed in April 2024, as reported by the Cabinet of Ministers’ permanent representative in the Verkhovna Rada, Taras Melnychuk, on his Telegram channel (Melnichuk T. 2024). Attempts to remove another Crimean Tatar representative from state administration appears as a change in Ukraine’s internal policy, when the Crimean project approaches its completion and all those appointed to positions dealing with the Crimean issue are dismissed on their own initiative.
Geopolitical tension reached a new level on December 7, 2024, when Turkey initiated large-scale military support for the Syrian opposition in their confrontation with the Assad regime and Russian military formations in (Syria Radio Svoboda Europe/Radio Liberty, 2023). This strategic move not only strengthened Turkey’s position as a force opposing totalitarian regimes on the international arena but also provoked a sharp escalation of tension in Russian-Turkish relations.
The Russian media space’s reaction to events was prompt and highly indicative, reflecting a strategy of deliberate information escalation. Russian state media launched a large-scale propaganda campaign with the central theme “Today Syria, tomorrow Crimea.” (24tv ua, 2024) As noted by Ukrainian and Russian analytical centers, a key element of this narrative became the portrayal of Erdogan’s actions as a “knife in the back,” (Unian,2024; RIAC,2024) which quickly became dominant in the Russian information field. As part of this campaign, Russian officials systematically spread theses about Turkey’s alleged “territorial ambitions” regarding Crimea, aimed at strengthening anti-Ukrainian and anti-Crimean Tatar sentiments.
Ukraine also reacted to this theme, but with a different interpretation: in Ukrainian media discourse, it transformed into a thesis about possible Turkish assistance in returning occupied territories. However, Russian information agents in Ukraine actively deployed a parallel campaign, claiming that Turkey allegedly seeks to take control of Crimea. This rhetoric spread through public statements by certain individuals formally representing the Ukrainian side, contributing to the scaling of Russian propaganda. Thus, the situation demonstrates the use of hybrid methods of information warfare, aimed at both undermining trust in Ukrainian-Turkish cooperation and increasing internal social polarization.
Xenophobia in Ukrainian Officials’ Rhetoric: Analysis of Rustem Umerov’s Case
During the height of geopolitical tension between Russia and Turkey, particular attention was drawn to a publication on the ZN.UA information platform analyzing Defense Minister Rustem Umerov’s activities (D. Kalenyuk, A. Hetmanchuk, M. Berlynska, 2024, 2024). The article, prepared by three prominent civil society representatives – Daria Kaleniuk, Olena Hetmanchuk, and Maria Berlinska, who position themselves as “watchdogs” (professional observers of state institutions) supported by Western grants and theoretically should be implementing European values in Ukraine, however, the article’s context and tone raise serious questions regarding professional standards of analytical journalism. Maria Berlinska’s statement in a UP interview that “the best scenario for Ukraine is not the 1991 borders, this needs to be forgotten”(Ukrainska Pravda, 2024 (30:00), potentially indicates that such statements could be interpreted as harbingers of political decisions that might change the country’s course. If such thoughts are perceived as preparation for concessions, this could affect both domestic and international policy, including Ukraine’s allies’ reactions.
The article criticizing the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s professional activities contains ambiguous ethnic connotations, which prompted legitimate reactions from both Crimean Tatar representatives and Ukrainian journalists and deputies. Among those who expressed concern about increasing xenophobic tendencies in Ukrainian media space were figures such as State Logistics Operator director Arsen Dzhumadinov, Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People Refat Chubarov, President of the Crimean Tatar Resource Center Eskender Bariev, President of the US Crimean Tatar Foundation Zera Mustafayeva, Ukrainian journalists and researchers including Larysa Voloshyna and Mykhailo Yakubovych, and MPs such as Mykola Kniazhytskyi and Akhtem Chiygoz. Particular concern was raised by a series of supporting materials from various Ukrainian public figures following the article, including MP Marianna Bezuhla (earlier, on September 19, 2024, 252 deputies removed her from the position of Deputy Chair of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence) (Zabozhko, 2024), MP Oleksiy Goncharenko, civic activist Vitaliy Shabunin, and journalist Yuriy Nikolov, (known for his questionable analytical texts). These publications, while declaring protection of state interests, effectively contributed to legitimizing xenophobic discourse.
These reactions serve as clear indicators of potential risks related to destabilizing inter-ethnic relations and increasing social tension. For a comprehensive and objective analysis, it’s necessary to examine in detail quotes that could be interpreted as discrediting, provoking inter-ethnic hostility, or undermining the authority of Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, a Crimean Tatar whose position in Ukrainian politics represents an important element of ethnic and national identity (Yirmidort, 2024).
Linguistic analysis of the text demonstrates deliberate distortion of cultural markers aimed at creating a negative narrative. Particularly revealing is the use of the term “saray”, which in Crimean Tatar traditionally means “palace“, but is deliberately interpreted in the article as “abandoned place for traders”. Such semantic manipulation serves as a tool for forming an image of the Crimean Tatar people as a “foreign element” supposedly connected exclusively with Turkey’s external interests. Notably, such word distortion resembles systematic Russian propaganda practices aimed at transforming positive meanings into derogatory ones. For example, the Ukrainian word “vrodlyva/вродлива” (beautiful) was deliberately replaced with “urodlivaya/уродливая” (ugly) in Russian narratives, corresponding to a similar approach in interpreting the term “saray.” This suggests that the article’s authors consciously borrow elements of Russian rhetoric, particularly relevant in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Even more concerning is the use of the term “sultan style” and references to “eastern despotism”. Such formulations not only demonstrate the authors’ orientalist prejudices but also create a dangerous precedent where a leader’s ethnic background automatically becomes grounds for assumptions about their management style.
The use of derogatory phrases like “the clan ruling there now is very close to Turkey” further reinforces the text’s manipulative nature, creating direct parallels with rhetoric typical of antisemitic and xenophobic narratives. In such cases, an ethnic group is portrayed as “foreign”, supposedly acting in the interests of “external forces”. This emphasizes the authors’ intent not only to discredit an individual figure or policy but to embed persistent stereotypes in public consciousness that divide and polarize society. Thus, the information attack is not just personalized but systematic, indicating the true motives and aims of this material directed at ethnic and cultural discreditation.
Rustem Umerov’s political trajectory and subsequent criticism of his activities as Ukraine’s Defense Minister presents a telling example of how ethnic identity continues to play a significant role in shaping modern Ukraine’s political discourse. Before his appointment as Defense Minister in September 2023, Umerov established himself as an effective statesman, recognized by the award of the Order of Merit, III degree in August 2021 (Baibak 2023). This fact is noteworthy in the context of broader discussion about the role of Crimean Tatars in post-Maidan Ukrainian politics.
Analysis of Umerov’s public activities demonstrates his significant contribution to developing Ukraine’s international relations, especially in military-technical cooperation. As The Wall Street Journal notes – “Umerov established close ties in the Muslim world, particularly with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Negotiations with Turkey played a crucial role in reaching an agreement with Russia to begin Ukrainian grain exports. Umerov also played a vital role in the September 2022 agreement, which included mediation by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates and led to the exchange of hundreds of prisoners, including Ukrainian military commanders captured in Mariupol” (Trofimov 2023).
The article’s text clearly contains elements of biased criticism aimed more at discreditation than constructive analysis. The main content is saturated with manipulative messages, personal attacks, and stereotypical assertions, making it more of a propaganda piece than objective journalistic research.
From the perspective of logic and common sense, it’s important to distinguish constructive criticism based on facts and clear arguments from attempts at chauvinistic manipulation of public opinion. This article focuses more on discrediting personality and probable connections than on objective evaluation of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s policies. Including ethnic and personal factors without substantiated evidence deprives it of any analytical weight and largely harms public discussion, creating an atmosphere of xenophobia.
In the context of Euro-Atlantic integration, such manifestations of xenophobia pose a direct threat to Ukraine’s national interests. The NATO Membership Action Plan (NATO Membership Action Plan 1999) contains clear requirements regarding the protection of indigenous peoples’ and national minorities’ rights. Moreover, these information operations violate numerous international norms: UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN Declaration 2007): Article 2 – prohibition of discrimination, Article 8 – protection from ethnic discrimination propaganda, Article 15 – right to dignity and cultural diversity. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute 1998), Article 7(1)(h) on persecution of identified groups, Article 25(3)(e) on incitement to discrimination.
Additional concern is raised by these information attacks being synchronized with key moments of strengthening Ukraine’s international position. After Erdogan’s statement at the Crimean Platform and subsequent Turkish support for Syrian opposition against Assad’s regime and Russian forces in December 2024, Russian State media launched a massive campaign with the refrain “Today Syria, tomorrow Crimea.” It was at this moment that anti-Crimean Tatar publications intensified in Ukrainian information space, suggesting possible coordination of actions.
The potential consequences of such information operations extend far beyond the domestic political situation. At the internal level, we observe a systematic attempt to undermine inter-ethnic unity, critical during wartime, discredit Crimean Tatar representatives in state authorities, and, particularly dangerous, demotivate Crimean Tatar youth from participating in state-building. At the international level, this leads to weakening strategic partnership with Turkey, undermining trust from the Islamic world, and compromising Ukraine’s image as a multinational democratic state.
As Arsen Dzhumadilov rightly notes, “Appealing to xenophobic sentiments in society is base. Have questions for the minister? Ask them as questions for a minister. Talk about actions, results, decisions. But not about origin or religion”. This thesis is particularly relevant in the context that modern Ukraine positions itself as a democratic state where professional qualities, not ethnic origin, determine a citizen’s opportunities.
Analysis of the situation’s development shows that we are dealing with a multi-level information operation aimed not only against specific political figures but against the fundamental foundations of Ukrainian statehood. As Crimean Tatar representatives in Ukraine and the USA note, “Our goal is to create a state that accepts and respects all its citizens. Otherwise, we risk following the path of intolerance, which contradicts the very essence of Ukraine and the values we are fighting for. After all, it is inclusivity and respect for diversity that sets us apart from the aggressor.”
In these conditions, developing a comprehensive strategy to counter ethnically motivated information operations becomes critically important. The experience of 2023-2024 shows that traditional mechanisms for protecting indigenous peoples’ and national minorities’ rights prove insufficient in the face of hybrid threats.
Special attention should be paid to the fact that discriminatory narratives are transmitted through respectable media platforms and legitimized by public figures. Indicative in this regard is the evolution of MP Bezuhla’s rhetoric, who, trying to distance herself from accusations of xenophobia, actually worsens the situation: “Of course, this may worsen the perception of Crimean Tatars as managers” – such statements directly contradict the principle of individual responsibility and contribute to collective stereotyping.
In the context of Euro-Atlantic integration, such trends pose a direct threat to Ukraine’s national interests. NATO’s requirements for protecting the rights of indigenous peoples and national minorities are not merely a formality but a fundamental criterion of state democracy. The inability to effectively counter xenophobic manifestations could become a serious obstacle on the path to Alliance membership.
Equally important is the geopolitical aspect of the problem – attempts to discredit Crimean Tatar politicians through their ethnic affiliation and ties with Turkey play into Russian propaganda, which seeks to present Ukraine as a failed state incapable of protecting the rights of indigenous peoples and national minorities. In conditions where Islamic world support is becoming an increasingly important factor in international politics, such information operations can seriously damage Ukraine’s strategic interests.
To effectively counter these challenges, a comprehensive approach is needed, including strengthening legal mechanisms against discrimination, developing monitoring systems for ethnically motivated information operations, improving society’s media literacy, strengthening inter-ethnic dialogue, and developing rapid response mechanisms to xenophobia manifestations in public space.
The experience of 2023-2024 shows – the more successful Ukraine is in the international arena, the more sophisticated attempts become to undermine its unity from within. This requires constant vigilance and readiness to confront even the subtlest manifestations of xenophobia in public space.
From the perspective of international law and Ukrainian legislation, public statements and media materials containing signs of ethnic discrimination fall under numerous legal norms providing for both administrative and criminal liability.
Analysis of the presented quotes from the ZN.UA (ZN.UA 2024) article and subsequent public statements by MPs reveals violations of the following legal norms. In the context of criminal legislation: Article 161 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code (Criminal Code of Ukraine 2001) “Violation of citizens’ equality based on their racial, national belonging, religious beliefs, disability and other characteristics” provides for punishment in the form of fines from two hundred to five hundred non-taxable minimum incomes or restriction of freedom for up to five years with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to three years. Particularly indicative in this context are statements forming negative ethnic stereotypes: “This is eastern management, and it cannot be different by its nature. They are used to ruling in sultan style” – this formulation directly falls under the definition of inciting national hostility.
International legal responsibility: Violation of Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD 1965) , which obligates member states to declare illegal and prohibit organizations that encourage and incite racial discrimination.
Regarding the analyzed publications, the violations are particularly grave because they were committed by MPs and public figures who have significant influence on public opinion. Formulations like “The Ministry of Defense is turning into a ‘Turkish court'” and “the clan is very close to Turkey” directly violate Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1966), which prohibits propaganda of national hatred.
In Ukrainian legislation, there is a direct analogy between protection from antisemitism and protection of other ethnic groups’ rights. The Law of Ukraine “On Prevention and Counteraction to Antisemitism in Ukraine”(Law on Prevention of Antisemitism 2021) creates an important precedent for protecting other ethnic groups from discrimination. Using ethnic stereotypes (“sultan style,” “eastern management”) in public discourse to discredit ethnic group representatives fully corresponds to the definition of discriminatory practice given in this law.Moreover, according to the Venice Commission (Venice Commission 2021), statements that may contribute to creating a hostile or discriminatory atmosphere regarding ethnic groups should be considered a serious violation of democratic norms, especially when they come from elected representatives of the people. In this context, MP Bezuhla’s statements that certain actions “may worsen the perception of Crimean Tatars as managers” constitute a direct violation of the non-discrimination principle.
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